Allowing for household preferences in emission trading-A contribution to the climate policy debate

In the context of emission trading it seems to be taken as given that people's preferences can be ignored with respect to the whole process of fixing emission targets and allocating emission permits to polluters. With this paper we want to reopen the debate on how citizens can be involved in this process. We try to show how citizen preferences can be included in the process of pollution control through emission trading. We propose an emission trading system where all emission permits are initially allocated to households who are then allowed to sell them in the permit market or to withhold (at least some of) them in order to reduce total pollution. This proposal tries to overcome the fundamental disadvantage of traditional permit systems which neglect consumer preferences by solely distributing emission permits to producers / polluters. In our system the property right to nature is re-allocated to the households who obtain the opportunity of reducing actual emissions according to their personal preferences by withholding a part or all of the emission permits allotted to them. Such a change in environmental policy would mark a return to the traditional principles of consumer sovereignty by involving households (at least partially) in the social abatement decision process instead of excluding them. Another advantage of admitting households to the TEP market as sellers or buyers of permits is that this increases the number of agents in the permit market and thus significantly reduces the possibilities of strategic market manipulations.Environmental policy; tradable emission permits; climate policy; consumer sovereignty

Allowing for Household Preferences in Emission Trading - A Contribution to the Climate Policy Debate

In the context of emission trading it seems to be taken as given that people's preferences can be ignored with respect to the whole process of fixing emission targets and allocating emission permits to polluters. With this paper we want to reopen the debate on how citizens can be involved in this process. We try to show how citizen preferences can be included in the process of pollution control through emission trading. We propose an emission trading system where all emission permits are initially allocated to households who are then allowed to sell them in the permit market or to withhold (at least some of) them in order to reduce total pollution. This proposal tries to overcome the fundamental disadvantage of traditional permit systems which neglect consumer preferences by solely distributing emission permits to producers/polluters. In our system the property right to nature is re-allocated to the households who obtain the opportunity of reducing actual emissions according to their personal preferences by withholding a part or all of the emission permits allotted to them. Such a change in environmental policy would mark a return to the traditional principles of consumer sovereignty by involving households (at least partially) in the social abatement decision process instead of excluding them. Another advantage of admitting households to the TEP market as sellers or buyers of permits is that this increases the number of agents in the permit market and thus significantly reduces the possibilities of strategic market manipulations.Environmental policy, tradable emission permits, climate policy, consumer sovereignty

Rate Cutting Tax Reforms and Corporate Tax Competition in Europe

While there is a large and growing number of studies on the determinants of corporate tax rates, the literature has so far ignored the fact that the behavior of governments in setting tax rates is often best described as a discrete choice decision problem. We set up an empirical model that relates a government's decision whether to cut its corporate tax rate to the country's own inherited tax and taxes in neighboring countries. Using comprehensive data on corporate tax reforms in Europe since 1980, we find evidence suggesting that the position in terms of the tax burden imposed on corporate income relative to geographical neighbors strongly affects the probability of rate cutting tax reforms. Countries are particularly likely to cut their statutory tax rate if the inherited tax is high and if they are exposed to low-tax neighbors. --Tax reform,tax competition,corporate taxes

Age, life-satisfaction, and relative income

We first confirm previous results with the German Socio-economic Panel, and obtain strong negative effects of comparison income. However, when we split the sample by age, we find quite different results for reference income. The effects on life-satisfaction are positive and significant for those under 46, consistent with Hirschman's (1973) tunnel effect and only negative (and larger than in the full sample) for those over 46, when relative deprivation dominates. Thus for young respondents, reference income's signalling role, indicating potential future prospects, can outweigh relative deprivation effects. Own-income effects are also larger for the older sample, and of greater magnitude than the comparison income effect. In East Germany the reference income effects are insignificant for all age groups. --

Conditional vorticity budget of coherent and incoherent flow contributions in fully developed homogeneous isotropic turbulence

We investigate the conditional vorticity budget of fully developed three-dimensional homogeneous isotropic turbulence with respect to coherent and incoherent flow contributions. The Coherent Vorticity Extraction based on orthogonal wavelets allows to decompose the vorticity field into coherent and incoherent contributions, of which the latter are noise-like. The impact of the vortex structures observed in fully developed turbulence on statistical balance equations is quantified considering the conditional vorticity budget. The connection between the basic structures present in the flow and their statistical implications is thereby assessed. The results are compared to those obtained for large- and small-scale contributions using a Fourier decomposition, which reveals pronounced differences

Considering household size in contingent valuation studies

In many empirical Contingent Valuation studies one finds that household size, i. e. the number auf household members, is negatively correlated with stated household willingness to pay for the realization of environmental projects. This observation is rather puzzling because in larger households more people can benefit from an environmental improvement than in small households. Therefore, the overall benefit should be greater for larger households. A plausible explanation could be that household budgets are tighter for large families than for smaller families with the same overall family income. The fact that larger families can afford only smaller willingness to pay statements in Contingent Valuation surveys than smaller families with the same income and the same preferences might have consequences for the allocation of public funds whenever the realization of an environmental project is made dependent on the outcome of a Contingent Valuation study. In this paper we show how the use of household equivalence scales for the assessment of environmental projects with the Contingent Valuation Method can serve to reduce the discrimination of members of large families